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DESIGN PROFESSIONAL LIABILITY FOR
CONSTRUCTION WORKSITE ACCIDENTS—
HOW ARKANSAS LED THE WAY TO A
NATIONAL CONSENSUS
Marc M. Schneier*
Three major developments underlie the law of architect or
engineer (a/e) liability to construction workers, beginning in the
second half of the twentieth century: (1) a change from a no-duty
regime to a duty of care under a foreseeability test, (2) reactions
to that expanded liability by changes to standard form documents
by industry associations (in particular the American Institute of
Architects (AIA)), (3) currently culminating in a broad national
consensus. The Arkansas Supreme Court was instrumental in
framing the issues of this jurisprudence early in its development
and later contributed to its continued evolution.
I. EARLY CASELAW AND AIA RESPONSE
Why should an a/e, who has no direct control over the
actions of any construction worker, owe a duty of care to injured
workers or their estates? This was never an issue until the fall of
the privity doctrine in the first third of the twentieth century.1 Yet
even then, a nexus between the a/e’s role in a construction project
and liability to construction workers was, arguably, not
straightforward. Nonetheless, the replacement of a no-duty rule
*
Attorney Editor of Construction Litigation Reporter since 1983, author or co-author
of several books and numerous articles on construction law, previous adjunct professor of
construction law at the University of San Francisco School of Law, and consultant on various
construction law subjects. He is profiled in the 2021 Marquis Who’s Who list of construction
lawyers. His website is buildinglaw.org.
1. See e.g., MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co., 111 N.E. 1050, 1052-53 (N.Y. 1916)
(adopting the privity doctrine). The privity defense was applied to shield an architect from
liability in Geare v. Sturgis, 14 F.2d 256, 256-57 (D.C. Cir. 1926) (theater patron killed in
theater collapse).
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under the auspices of the privity doctrine, with a test for
foreseeability to establish the existence of a duty, was more than
sufficient to bridge that gap.
Appreciating the effect of the fall of the privity defense
requires an understanding of the architect’s role in supervising a
contractor’s performance at the mid-point of the twentieth
century. This baseline understanding can be discerned through
an examination of the AIA’s 1951 standard form documents.2
Under the “Standard Form of Agreement Between Owner and
Architect,” the architect provided “general supervision to guard
the Owner against defects and deficiencies in the work of
contractors.”3 Under the “General Conditions of the Contract for
the Construction of Buildings,” a section titled “Architect’s
Status,” combined the duty of supervision with the architect’s
authority to stop the work:
The Architect shall have general supervision and direction
of the work. He is the agent of the Owner only to the extent
provided in the Contract Documents and when in special
instances he is authorized by the Owner so to act, and in such
instances he shall, upon request, show the Contractor written
authority. He has authority to stop the work whenever such
stoppage may be necessary to insure the proper execution of
the Contract.4

In short, in addition to being the project designer, which
included review of shop drawings created by subcontractors, the
architect’s administrative duties involved supervision and
direction of the contractor’s performance, backed up by the

2. Of course, the AIA now competes with several other industry organizations which
have produced their own, competing standard form documents, including: the Associated
General Contractors of America (AGC) and associated entities, publishers of
ConsensusDocs; the National Society of Professionals Engineers (NSPE) and affiliated
organizations, which publish documents prepared by the Engineers Joint Contract
Documents Committee (EJCDC); the Design-Build Institute of America (DBIA); and the
Construction Management Association of America (CMAA). However, in the mid-twentieth
century, the AIA reigned supreme. See generally Justin Sweet, The American Institute of
Architects: Dominant Actor in the Construction Documents Market, 1991 WIS. L. REV. 317
(1991).
3. AM. INST. OF ARCHITECTS, AIA DOC. B102 art. 7 (1951).
4. AM. INST. OF ARCHITECTS, AIA DOC. A2 art. 38 (1951) (emphasis added).
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authority to stop the work. How did the fall of privity affect this
industry understanding of the architect’s role?
Caselaw spanning a little more than a decade, from 1959 to
1970, in which Arkansas loomed large, upended this baseline
understanding, at least regarding worksite accidents.5 The first
decision was not in Arkansas but in Louisiana. Renovation of a
public hospital in Louisiana in the mid-1950s included
installation of a new boiler.6 The boiler exploded while being
tested, killing a subcontractor’s employee.7 The explosion was
caused by the boiler’s lack of a pressure relief valve (although
required by the specifications).8 The estate sued the project’s
architects and a consulting engineer (hired by the architects) for
negligence.9 After a lengthy trial, all defendants except the
architects and their insurer were exonerated.10
On appeal, the architects raised the privity defense.11 In a
1959 decision, Day v. Nat’l U.S. Radiator Corp., the Louisiana
Court of Appeals rejected that defense and ruled that the architect
owed a duty of care to foreseeable victims of the boiler
5. For an in-depth review of this caselaw, see generally Justin Sweet, Site Architects
and Construction Workers: Brothers and Keepers or Strangers?, 28 EMORY L.J. 291 (1979)
[hereinafter Site Architects]. For further discussion, see generally 5 PHILIP L. BRUNER &
PATRICK J. O’CONNOR, JR., BRUNER & O’CONNOR ON CONSTRUCTION LAW 663-688 §§
17:52-17:58 (2002, 2021 Supp.); DWIGHT G. CONGER et al., CONSTRUCTION ACCIDENT
LITIGATION ch. 2 (2d ed. 2021); MARC M. SCHNEIER, CONSTRUCTION ACCIDENT LAW: A
COMPREHENSIVE GUIDE TO LEGAL LIABILITY AND INSURANCE CLAIMS 252 (1999); Karen
S. Precella, Architect Liability: Should an Architect’s Status Create a Duty to Protect
Construction Workers from Job-Site Hazards?, 11 CONSTR. LAW. 11 (1991); Wyatt A.
Hoch, Architects’ Liability for Construction Site Accidents, 30 U. KAN. L. REV. 429 (1982);
Northwestern University School of Law, The Supervising Architect, His Liabilities and His
Remedies When a Worker Is Injured, 64 NW. U. L. REV. 535 (1969); Marc M. Schneier,
Architect’s or Engineer’s Liability for Injury or Death of Construction Worker on
Construction Site Project, 56 A.L.R.7th art. 7 (2020) [hereinafter Architect’s or Engineer’s
Liability]. Design professional liability under the Occupational Safety and Health Act, not
the topic of this article, is discussed in John E. Bulman et al., The Horns of a Dilemma: Too
Much Involvement in Worksite Safety Can Backfire on Design Professionals, 21 CONSTR.
LAW. 5 (2001).
6. See Day v. Nat’l U.S. Radiator Corp., 117 So. 2d 104, 107, 109 (La. Ct. App. 1959),
rev’d, 128 So. 2d 660 (La. 1961).
7. See id. at 107.
8. Id. at 122.
9. Id. at 107.
10. Id. at 130, 135.
11. See Day, 117 So. 2d at 118.
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subcontractor’s negligence in failing to include the pressure relief
valve.12 The court identified, as the source of that duty, a
provision in the design agreement which required the architects
to supervise the work.13 Professor Justin Sweet wrote that the
decision “shocked the AIA.”14 He continued:
It seemed to require that the architect be present, if not
continuously, at least at every crucial point in the
construction process, judged from a worker safety
standpoint. This, the AIA felt, went beyond the proper role
of the architect and his contract commitment. . . . Finally,
the AIA believed that by concluding the architects were
negligent in approving shop drawings which did not show
the pressure relief valve, the court revealed its
misunderstanding of the architects’ function in reviewing
shop drawings. To the AIA, review is made for design
purposes only and is not intended to be an approval of the
means by which design compliance will be achieved.15

While the Day decision was on appeal, attention shifted to
the Arkansas Supreme Court. A 1960 decision, Erhart v.
Hummonds, involved an excavation cave-in which killed or
injured several subcontractor employees.16 Here, unlike in the
Louisiana case, the architect knew of the danger and acted on that
knowledge—he demanded that the contractor replace the job
superintendent and threatened to order the work stopped, as he
had the contractual power to do.17 The trench collapsed before
any remediation of the safety violations occurred, and the
Arkansas Supreme Court deferred to the jury’s finding of
negligence by the architect.18 So, as of 1960, two appellate court

12. Id. at 119-20.
13. See id. at 124. The appellate court did not quote the contract language, but the
supreme court did, stating that the architect had agreed to provide “‘adequate supervision of
the execution of the work to reasonably insure strict conformity with the working drawings,
specifications and other contract documents’, and this supervision was to include ‘frequent
visits to the work site.’” Day v. Nat’l U.S. Radiator Corp., 128 So. 2d 660, 666 (La. 1961).
14. Site Architects, supra note 5, at 303.
15. Id.
16. 232 Ark. 133, 135, 334 S.W.2d 869, 871 (1960).
17. See id. at 135, 334 S.W.2d at 871.
18. Id. at 136, 138, 334 S.W.2d at 871-72.
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decisions had rejected the privity defense and found an architect
owed construction workers a duty of care.19
In 1961, the Louisiana Supreme Court reversed the court of
appeals and held the architect’s contractual duty of supervision
did not impose upon the architect a duty of care owed to
construction workers.20 In contrast to the court of appeals,21 the
supreme court interpreted the design agreement’s supervision
requirement as creating a duty owed only to the project owner,
that the work would comply with the design.22 The supreme court
continued:
[W]e do not think that under the contract in the instant case
the architects were charged with the duty or obligation to
inspect the methods employed by the contractor or the
subcontractor in fulfilling the contract or the subcontract.
Consequently we do not agree with the Court of Appeal that
the architects had a duty to the deceased Day, an employee
of [the plumbing subcontractor], to inspect the hot water
system during its installation, or that they were charged with
the duty of knowing that the boiler was being installed.23

Apparently even the possibility of increased liability stirred
the AIA into action. While the Louisiana Court of Appeals’ Day
decision was not released until 1959,24 in its 1958 design
agreement, the AIA deleted “supervision” from the standard
agreement and replaced it with language emphasizing observation
through periodic visits.25 The AIA also made clear in the 1958
document that the duty to inspect was not a guarantee or warranty
that the work was defect-free.26 Just three years later, in 1961, the
19. See id. at 136-37, 334 S.W.3d at 871-72; Day v. Nat’l U.S. Radiator Corp., 117 So.
2d 104, 119 (La. Ct. App. 1959), rev’d, 128 So. 2d 660 (La. 1961).
20. Day v. Nat’l U.S. Radiator Corp., 128 So. 2d 660, 666 (La. 1961).
21. Day, 117 So. 2d at 119-20.
22. Day, 128 So. 2d at 666.
23. Id.
24. Day, 117 So. 2d at 104.
25. AM. INST. OF ARCHITECTS, AIA DOC. B131 § C(I)(4)(b) (1958) (requiring the
architect to provide “periodic inspections at the site”). Note that the AIA renumbered the
owner/architect contract from Document B102 in 1951 to Document B131 in 1958.
Compare Id., with AM. INST. OF ARCHITECTS, AIA DOC. B102.
26. AM. INST. OF ARCHITECTS, AIA DOC. B131, supra note 25, § C(I)(4)(c) (obligating
the architect only to “endeavor to guard the Owner against defects and deficiencies in the
work of the contractors”).
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AIA again revised its owner/architect agreement.27 It removed
the architect’s duty of inspection, instead providing that the
architect was to make “periodic visits to the site to familiarize
himself generally with the progress and quality of the work and
to determine in general if the work is proceeding in accordance
with the Contract Documents.”28
While the AIA removed the duty of supervision from the
owner/architect agreement in 1958, and from the General
Conditions in 1961,29 the General Conditions’ “Architect’s
Status” article continued to grant the architect “authority to stop
the work whenever such stoppage may be necessary in his
reasonable opinion to insure the proper execution of the
Contract.”30 Yet the AIA soon had cause to reexamine that
language.
In a 1967 decision, Miller v. De Witt, the Illinois Supreme
Court stated that the architect’s power to stop the work was
relevant in determining whether an architect had acted reasonably
under the Illinois Structural Work Act,31 after failing to prevent
the contractor from removing supporting columns, causing the
roof to collapse.32 The AIA’s response was the 1970 edition of
the General Conditions, which might be called the first “modern”
AIA document.33
First, this 1970 “General Conditions of the Contract for
Construction” eliminated the architect’s power to stop the work
and gave that authority solely to the owner.34 Second, it created
27. See generally AM. INST. OF ARCHITECTS, AIA DOC. B131 (1961) (the new
standard form of agreement between owner and architect as of 1961).
28. Id. § C(I)(4)(c).
29. Compare AM. INST. OF ARCHITECTS, AIA DOC. A201 art. 38 (1958) (“The
Architect shall have general supervision and direction of the work.”), with AM. INST. OF
ARCHITECTS, AIA DOC. A201 art. 38 (1961) (“The Architect shall be the Owner’s
representative during the construction period and he shall observe the work in process on
behalf of the Owner.”).
30. AM. INST. OF ARCHITECTS, AIA DOC. A201 (1961), supra note 29, art. 38; AM.
INST. OF ARCHITECTS, AIA DOC. A201 (1958), supra note 29, art. 38.
31. 740 ILL. COMP. STAT. 150/0.01-9 (repealed 1995).
32. 226 N.E.2d 630 (Ill. 1967), superseded by statute, ILL. COMP. STAT. 70/301 (1979),
as recognized in Doyle v. Rhodes, 461 N.E.2d 382, 387-88 (Ill. 1984).
33. See generally AM. INST. OF ARCHITECTS, AIA DOC. A201 (1970); see also
American Institute of Architects, History, AIA (2022), [https://perma.cc/9C5U-AKH8].
34. AM. INST. OF ARCHITECTS, AIA DOC. A201, supra note 33, ¶ 3.3.1.

6 SCHNEIER.MAN.FIN COPY.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

2022

6/6/22 6:58 PM

DESIGN PROFESSIONAL LIABILITY

387

a new article exclusively devoted to imposing site safety
responsibility on the contractor.35 This language has remained
virtually unchanged in later editions of the General Conditions.36
Third, it disclaimed the architect’s responsibility for performance
of the construction work and for safety measures:
The Architect will not be responsible for construction means,
methods, techniques, sequences or procedures, or for safety
precautions and programs in connection with the Work, and
he will not be responsible for the Contractor’s failure to carry
out the Work in accordance with the Contract Documents.37

These changes have remained nearly verbatim with each
new edition of the AIA documents, and the risk-limiting strategies
they adopt for architects have been embraced by other industry
organizations’ standard form documents.38
II. ARKANSAS LAW: LIABILITY FOR SUPERVISION
AND DESIGN SERVICES
Two additional Arkansas Supreme Court decisions, issued
in 1966 and 1970, cemented evolution of the judicial approach to
worksite accident claims based upon the a/e’s duty to be present
at the construction site during performance by the contractor—an
35. Id. ¶ 10.
36. In the current General Conditions, contractor responsibility for site safety is found
in AM. INST. OF ARCHITECTS, AIA DOC. A201 ¶ ¶ 3.3.1, 3.7.2, 10.2 (2017).
37. AM. INST. OF ARCHITECTS, AIA DOC. A201, supra note 33, § 2.2.4. In the current
General Conditions, this disclaimer by the architect, although somewhat differently phrased,
appears in AM. INST. OF ARCHITECTS, AIA DOC. A201, supra note 36, § 4.2.2.
38. See, e.g., ENGINEERS JOINT CONTRACT DOCUMENTS COMMITTEE, EJCDC DOC.
E-500 ¶ 6 § 6.01(I) (2020) (“Engineer shall not at any time supervise, direct, control, or have
authority over any Constructor’s work, nor will Engineer have authority over or be
responsible for the means, methods, techniques, sequences, or procedures of construction
selected or used by any Constructor, or the safety precautions and programs incident thereto
. . . .”); ENGINEERS JOINT CONTRACT DOCUMENTS COMMITTEE, EJCDC DOC. C-700 ¶ 7 §
7.01(A) (2018) (“Contractor shall be solely responsible for the means, methods, techniques,
sequences, and procedures of construction”); CONSENSUSDOCS, DOC. 240 § 3.2.8.3 (2017)
(“Design Professional shall not be responsible for construction means, methods, techniques,
sequences, and procedures, unless they are specified by Design Professional . . . .”).
However, Doc. 240’s “Standard Agreement Between Owner and Design Professional,”
uniquely among industry standard form documents, imposes upon a design professional, who
“has actual knowledge of safety violations,” an affirmative duty to notify the owner. Id. §
3.2.8.4. No court has interpreted this language.
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evolution now reflecting the national consensus.39 The first case,
Walker v. Wittenberg, Delony & Davidson, Inc.,40 is particularly
instructive. On a commercial project, the architect was hired by
an oral agreement, but the City of Little Rock Building Code
Section 204 mandated the owner employ an architect and required
that architect to perform specific inspections of the work.41 The
parties also used the AIA General Conditions, AIA A201 (1958),
which in Article 38 stated that “[t]he Architect shall have general
supervision and direction of the work.”42
A contractor’s employee was injured when the wall he was
standing on collapsed under him when braces were removed.43
Plaintiff sued the architect for negligent supervision, and the trial
court entered a directed verdict in favor of the architect.44 Citing
its earlier decision in Erhart, the Arkansas Supreme Court
reversed, finding that the contractual duty of supervision (under
the General Conditions) created a jury question as to whether the
architect breached a duty of care owed to the plaintiff.45 The court
rejected the architect’s argument—that its duty of supervision
was owed only to the owner and was for the limited purpose of
ensuring a completed building was in compliance with the
design—observing that the same argument had been rejected in
Erhart.46
Yet, after granting a rehearing, the court reversed.47 The
court held that, under the General Conditions, the architect’s duty
39. See Walker v. Wittenberg, Delony & Davidson, Inc., 242 Ark. 97, 108, 412 S.W.2d
621, 631 (1967) (Walker II); Heslep v. Forrest & Cotton, Inc., 247 Ark. 1066, 1067, 449
S.W.2d 18, 182 (1970).
40. Walker II, 242 Ark. 97, 412 S.W.2d 621.
41. Id. at 100-01, 412 S.W.2d at 627. The architect was required to inspect the
foundation, the framing, and to make a final inspection, per the full language of Section 204.
Id. at 101-03, 412 S.W.2d at 628.
42. See AM. INST. OF ARCHITECTS, AIA DOC 201 (1958), supra note 29, art. 38. The
court initially said that the parties used the 1952 edition of A201 (See Walker v. Wittenberg,
Delony & Davidson, Inc., 241 Ark. 525, 527, 412 S.W.2d 621, 623 (Walker I)) but corrected
itself in the opinion issued after a rehearing (See Walker II, 242 Ark. at 103-04, 412 S.W.2d
at 629).
43. Walker I, 241 Ark. at 526-27, 412 S.W.2d at 622-23.
44. Id. at 526-27, 412 S.W.2d at 623.
45. Id. at 529-30, 412 S.W.2d at 624.
46. Id. at 528-30, 412 S.W.2d at 624.
47. Walker II, 242 Ark. at 97-98, 412 S.W.2d at 626.
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of supervision did not require it to be “present continuously
during construction,” nor did the architect have the authority or a
“duty to prescribe safety precautions for the contractor or to
enforce performance of the safety provisions contained in the
contract between the owner and the contractor, to which he was
not a party.”48 Invoking the presumption that parties contract
only for themselves, the court concluded:
Before an architect can be said to have agreed with an owner
to exercise direct control over a contractor with respect to
day-to-day safety supervision of a building contract, such
agreement must clearly appear from the terms of the
agreement, the conduct of the parties, or the nature of the
work being performed.49

The court then distinguished Erhart on three grounds.50
First, the hazard in that case constituted a “special danger” within
the meaning of the Restatement (Second) of Torts § 427.51
Second, the architect in Erhart was expressly employed to
supervise the work.52 Third, the architect knew of the danger;53
by contrast, in Walker II, “the architect had no reason to
contemplate the contractor’s negligence when the contract was
made, i.e., the negligence here was collateral to the risk of doing
the work.”54 Limiting Erhart to the underlying circumstances, the

48. Id. at 98, 412 S.W.2d at 626.
49. Id. at 106, 412 S.W.2d at 630.
50. Id.
51. See id. at 106, 412 S.W.2d at 630 (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 427
(AM. L. INST. 1965)). Section 427, titled “Negligence as to Danger Inherent in the Work,”
is one of the numerous exceptions to the so-called independent contractor rule. See also
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 409 (AM. L. INST. 1965). Section 427 applies to
“[o]ne who employs an independent contractor to do work involving a special danger to
others which the employer knows or has reason to know to be inherent in or normal to the
work . . . is subject to liability for physical harm caused to such others by the contractor’s
failure to take reasonable precautions against such danger.” RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
TORTS § 427.
52. Walker II, 242 Ark. at 106, 412 S.W.2d at 630.
53. Id. at 106, 412 S.W.2d at 630.
54. Id. at 98, 412 S.W.2d at 626 (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 426(a)
(AM. L. INST. 1965)). The section cited provides that “an employer of an independent
contractor . . . is not liable for physical harm caused by any negligence of the contractor if
. . . the contractor’s negligence consists solely in the improper manner in which he does the
work . . . .” Of course, it should be noted that these Restatement provisions apply to
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court stated that the “correct rule” was stated in the Louisiana
Supreme Court’s Day decision.55
A final “supervision” case by the Arkansas Supreme Court
was issued three years later.56 In Heslep v. Forrest & Cotton, Inc.,
a contractor’s employee used a front-end loader with a mobile
crane to move a piece of pipe near a high-voltage power line (in
violation of a safety statute), rather than wait for a truck to move
the pipe.57 The crane created an arc with a power line. The
injured worker sued the resident engineer, hired to inspect the
work for compliance with the architect’s design, for permitting
use of the crane without requiring the general contractor to
insulate the boom or order the overhead line de-energized.58
In affirming a judgment notwithstanding the verdict in favor
of the engineer, the Arkansas Supreme Court reasoned that the
“engineers’ rights and powers are not to be confused with their
obligations and duties under their contracts.”59 Specifically,
“they do not have the right, power, obligation or the duty to
supervise [the contractor’s employees] in the performance of their
duties.”60 The contractor, not the engineer, had the obligation to
guarantee site safety under the contract and performance in
compliance with the safety statute.61
To recap, under Erhart, Walker II, and Heslep, a design
professional’s contractual duty of supervision, even under the
1950s-era AIA standard form documents, cannot establish a
safety duty of care owed to construction workers, at least where
the a/e did not know of the hazardous condition beforehand.62 A
designer’s rights or powers under its contract with the owner are
employers of independent contractors, not to a project architect, who did not hire the general
contractor or any subcontractor.
55. Walker II, 242 Ark. at 107, 412 S.W.2d at 630-31 (citing Day v. Nat’l U.S. Radiator
Corp., 128 So. 2d 660 (La. 1961)).
56. Heslep v. Forrest & Cotton, Inc., 247 Ark. 1066, 449 S.W.2d 181 (1970).
57. Id. at 1067-68, 1071, 449 S.W.2d at 181-83.
58. Id. at 1067, 449 S.W.2d at 182.
59. Id. at 1072, 449 S.W.2d at 184.
60. Id. at 1072, 449 S.W.2d at 184 (emphasis omitted).
61. Heslep, 247 Ark. at 1070-71, 1073, 449 S.W.2d at 183-84.
62. See Erhart v. Hummonds, 232 Ark. 133, 135, 334 S.W.2d 869, 870-71 (1960);
Walker II, 242 Ark. 97, 98, 412 S.W.2d 621, 626 (1967); Heslep, 247 Ark. at 1072, 449
S.W.2d at 184.
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presumptively only for the benefit of the owner.63 Absent clear
contract indications, these obligations do not accrue to the benefit
of construction workers injured by an unsafe manner of
performance, as responsibility for safe performance lies squarely
on the contractor.64 These conclusions were exactly the goals
sought by the AIA when it created the “modern” AIA standard
form documents starting in 1970.
Of course, before an architect’s or engineer’s on-site
activities (whether described as supervision or inspection) may
arise, the a/e must first create the project’s design, and injured
construction workers have alleged negligent design as a standalone basis for liability.65 Again, the Arkansas high court helped
establish a national jurisprudence.
In Hill Constr. Co. v. Bragg, a steel erection subcontractor’s
employee was injured by the fall of a column that was being
erected in a high wind.66 No guy wires or other bracing were used
to temporarily hold the column, and the plaintiff blamed both the
general contractor and the architect’s design for the accident.67 A
jury agreed, attributing 90% fault to the general contractor and
10% fault to the architect.68
The supreme court reversed and remanded, ruling that the
defendants’ proffered instruction on intervening cause (by the
subcontractor) should have been provided.69 The court noted that,
while the architect and engineer had specified the use of guy wires
and other bracings during the steel erection process, the
subcontractor had used only wooden wedges to temporarily brace
steel columns.70 Nonetheless, the court also rejected the
architect’s assertion that a directed verdict should have been
entered at the close of plaintiff’s evidence, stating:
While it is true there was sufficient evidence of the
subcontractor’s negligence to warrant an instruction on
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.

Walker II, 242 Ark. at 98, 412 S.W.2d at 626.
Heslep, 247 Ark. at 1072-73, 449 S.W.2d at 184.
See infra Part III.
291 Ark. 382, 384, 725 S.W.2d 538, 539 (1987).
Id. at 384, 725 S.W.2d at 540.
Id. at 384, 725 S.W.2d at 539.
Id. at 390, 725 S.W.2d at 543.
Id. at 384, 725 S.W.2d at 540.
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intervening proximate cause, there was also evidence that
there were problems with the design of the column’s anchor
bolts and that they were offset, and that the layout of
the portion of the building which had been constructed when
the column was erected was an “ironworker’s nightmare.”
There was sufficient evidence to send the question of [the
contractor’s] and [the architect’s] negligence to the jury.71

In the Arkansas Supreme Court’s only decision in the
twenty-first century on the issue of design professional liability
for a construction site accident, Clark v. Transcon. Ins. Co., a
worker was electrocuted while carrying a metal pole eight feet
from an overhead power line.72 He sued the architect for
negligent design arguing that, because the construction site was
located near the high-voltage overhead line, the architect had a
duty to delineate the proximity of the power line in a way that
would be readily determinable by looking at the plans, but had
not done so.73 The architect countered that it had no duty to
supervise the construction, advise the utility to de-energize the
power line, or specify any safety measures.74 The trial court
granted the architect’s motion for summary judgment.75
Declaring that “[a]n architect has the duty of exercising
reasonable care in the preparation of plans,”76 and pointing to
expert testimony submitted by plaintiff that the defendant had
violated that duty, the supreme court reversed.77 In the face of
that expert testimony, the defendant:
[F]ailed to provide evidence or authority to show that
architects are not responsible for accurately depicting the
location of power lines on plans. He also failed to provide
evidence or authority to show that architects are not

71. Hill Constr. Co., 291 Ark. at 387-88, 725 S.W.2d at 541. As revealed by a
subsequent appeal from the second trial (on an unrelated issue), the jury found the architect
was not liable. See Bragg v. Mayes, Sudderth & Etheredge, Inc., 297 Ark. 537-38, 764
S.W.2d 44, 45 (1989).
72. 359 Ark. 340, 344, 197 S.W.3d 449, 451 (2004).
73. Id. at 345, 197 S.W.3d at 452.
74. Id. at 352, 197 S.W.3d at 456.
75. Id. at 350, 197 S.W.3d at 455.
76. Id. at 352, 197 S.W.3d at 457.
77. Clark, 359 Ark. at 352-53, 197 S.W.3d at 457.
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responsible for providing warnings on the plans of the need
to avoid the hazard produced by the power line.78

The fundamental difference in the Arkansas Supreme
Court’s treatment of claims arising out of an a/e’s supervision or
inspection duties versus those involving allegations of negligent
design is clear. A design professional’s duty of supervision or
inspection is presumptively owed to the owner alone.79 Absent
an a/e’s knowledge of the hazardous condition, its contractual
power during inspections to possibly perceive dangerous
performance methods is insufficient to trigger a safety duty of
care owed to construction workers.80 By contrast, creation of a
design may well include responsibility to take into consideration
safety features of the project site and even the method of
performance.81
III. NATIONAL LAW—LIABILITY ARISING FROM
DESIGN
The Arkansas caselaw discussed above is both a historical
introduction to, and a mirror of contemporary national law.82 The
clear majority rule is that an architect may be liable for a worksite
accident caused at least in part by a defective design.83 Indeed,
even those states which have enacted statutes partially shielding
architects and engineers from liability claims by injured workers
or their estates consistently except negligent design claims.84
In light of that majority rule, an understanding of what
constitutes a design defect, for purposes of an injured worker’s
construction accident claim, is essential. Clearly, as each
construction site is unique, no definitive list of defects is possible,
and the following recounting is simply a sampling of claims that
have been made:

78.
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.

Id. at 353, 197 S.W.3d at 457.
Walker II, 242 Ark. 97, 99-100, 106, 412 S.W.2d 621, 627, 630 (1967).
See supra note 61 and accompanying text.
See infra Part III.
See supra Part II.
Geer v. Bennett, 237 So. 2d 311, 316 (Fla. 1970).
See infra note 116.
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Failure to specify bracing for unsupported wall during
partial demolition;85
On a project to renovate a sewage treatment plant where
toxic gases escaped from an adjoining room killing
construction workers, the design’s inclusion of a window
between the area of the building containing the wet
sludge and the rest of the building violated a design
standard from an engineering association, adopted by
Iowa, which prohibited “‘interconnection between the
wet well and dry well ventilating systems’”;86
Where the engineer on site indicated to the contractor to
cut a pipe along its length, and when the contractor did
so the pipe rolled outward, causing its employee who
was standing on the pipe to fall and be crushed when the
pipe rolled on top of him, the court found the estate stated
a claim for negligent design, reasoning, “[w]e perceive
no appreciable distinction between providing the
specifications for pipe cutting through a professional
drawing or by physically marking on the pipe”;87
Collapse of steel frame during erection traced to
engineer’s incorrect calculation of the correct sizes of
steel members;88
Specification of a “double connection” method to
connect two horizontal steel beams, caused the beams to
bend and workers sitting on it to fall;89

85. Wagner v. Grannis, 287 F. Supp. 18, 25 (W.D. Pa. 1968).
86. Evans v. Howard R. Green Co., 231 N.W.2d 907, 913 (Iowa 1975) (jury finding of
liability upheld).
87. Edwards v. Anderson Eng’g, Inc., 166 P.3d 1047, 1055 (Kan. 2007) (rejecting a
statutory defense found in then KAN. STAT. ANN. § 44-501(f), now KAN. STAT. ANN. § 44501(d) (2006)).
88. See Mudgett v. Marshall, 574 A.2d 867, 871-72 (Me. 1990) (The engineer
calculated a rafter beam of 36’ by 150’, instead of 36’ by 230’; the longer rafter beam would
have had greater lateral stiffness and an increased resistance to buckling, while the shorter
beams would have required the addition of 16 permanent knee braces—the design specified
only two—for safe erection.).
89. Tiffany v. Christman Co., 287 N.W.2d 199, 202-03, 209 (Mich. Ct. App. 1979)
(jury verdict upheld; the engineer knew of a prior accident of the same nature six weeks
earlier but did not alter the design).
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Authorizing substitution of anchor bolts with expansion
bolts, which were insufficient to stop the steel beam from
falling over;90
The engineer directed city employees to undertake a
course of conduct without first conducting an
engineering analysis;91
Design of trench bracing system, which failed, causing
the trench to collapse onto a worker present in the
trench;92 and
Design omitting safety-related information as to the
project site.93

Defenses to a defective design claim include that:
• The architect or engineer is not responsible for the
•
•
•

inclusion of temporary safety measures during the
erection of the structural steel;94
The architect is not responsible for inclusion of bracing
methods for a trench excavation;95
Lack of or insufficient expert testimony to establish the
defendant’s professional negligence;96
No causal connection between the alleged design defect
and the accident;97

90. See Campbell v. Daimler Grp., Inc., 686 N.E.2d 337, 339-40, 344-45 (Ohio Ct.
App. 1996), appeal denied, 677 N.E.2d 816 (Ohio 1997).
91. See Michaels v. CH2M Hill, Inc., 257 P.3d 532, 536-37 (Wash. 2011).
92. See Bauer v. Howard S. Wright Constr., No. 44817-0-1, 2000 WL 987165 at *1
(Wash. Ct. App. July 17, 2000).
93. Mallow v. Tucker, Sadler & Bennett, Architects & Eng’rs, Inc., 54 Cal. Rptr. 174,
176 (Cal. Ct. App. 1966) (design did not indicate underground high-voltage transmission
line).
94. Cady v. E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co., 437 F. Supp. 1030, 1033 (S.D. Tex. 1977);
Nicholson v. Turner/Cargile, 669 N.E.2d 529, 533 (Ohio Ct. App. 1995).
95. Jones v. James Reeves Contractors, Inc., 701 So. 2d 774, 784-86 (Miss. 1997);
McAninch v. Robinson, 942 S.W.2d 452, 456-58 (Mo. Ct. App. 1997).
96. Paxton v. Alameda Cnty., 259 P.2d 934, 942-43 (Cal. Ct. App. 1953); Hobson v.
Waggoner Eng’g, Inc., 878 So. 2d 68, 77, 80 (Miss. Ct. App. 2003); Simon v. Drake Constr.
Co., 621 N.E.2d 837, 839 (Ohio Ct. App. 1993); Nauman v. Harold K. Beecher & Assocs.,
467 P.2d 610, 616-17 (Utah 1970).
97. Hutcheson v. E. Eng’g Co., 209 S.E.2d 680, 681 (Ga. Ct. App. 1974) (contractor
removed guardrails required by the specifications); Walters v. Kellam & Foley, 360 N.E.2d
199, 206-11 (Ind. Ct. App. 1977); Demetro v. Dormitory Auth., 96 N.Y.S.3d 30, 33 (N.Y.
App. Div. 2019).
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Performance methods or safety measures are the domain
of the contractor and not the architect’s responsibility to
include in the design;98 and
Information not included in the design was not the
architect’s responsibility to include.99

Closely related to design liability is an architect’s liability
arising out of its review of shop drawings, and failure to detect a
defect in the drawings.100 Courts rejecting liability often do so to
enforce the disclaimer in the modern AIA documents, which
provide that the architect’s approval of shop drawings is “only for
the limited purpose of checking for conformance with
information given and the design concept expressed in the
Contract Documents.”101
IV. NATIONAL LAW—LIABILITY ARISING FROM
SITE SERVICES
Unlike claims for negligent design, courts faced with the
modern AIA standard form documents have, to a large degree,
enforced the disclaimers limiting the architect’s authority over the
contractor’s manner or method of performance, while imposing
98. Nat’l Found. Co. v. Post, Buckley, Schuh & Jernigan, Inc., 465 S.E.2d 726, 730
(Ga. Ct. App. 1995) (lack of temporary handrails on walkway); Burns v. Black & Veatch
Architects, Inc., 854 S.W.2d 450, 454-55 (Mo. Ct. App. 1993), (unshored trench); Wells v.
Stanley J. Thill & Assocs., Inc., 452 P.2d 1015, 1018 (Mont. 1969) (unshored trench).
99. See, e.g., Jones v. City of Logansport, 436 N.E.2d 1138, 1144-45, 1150-51 (Ind.
Ct. App. 1982), reh’g denied, 439 N.E.2d 666 (Ind. Ct. App. 1982) (design specification did
not include overhead, uninsulated power line); Patin v. Indust. Enters. Inc., 421 So. 2d 362,
366 (La. Ct. App. 1982) (electric wires); Frampton v. Dauphin Distrib. Servs. Co., 648 A.2d
326, 327 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1994) (power lines); Alexander v. State, 347 So. 2d 1249, 1250,
1252 (La. Ct. App. 1977) (underground butane tank). See also Transp. Ins. Co., Inc. v.
Hunzinger Constr. Co., 507 N.W.2d 136, 140-41 (Wis. Ct. App. 1993) (design not required
to show method of performance); Kaltenbrun v. City of Port Washington, 457 N.W.2d 527,
531 (Wis. Ct. App. 1990) (no duty to test soil at the site’s ingress and egress routes to ensure
they were adequate to bear the weight of a dump truck coming to the site).
100. See Jaeger v. Henningson, Durham & Richardson, Inc., 714 F.2d 773, 775 (8th
Cir. 1983); Juno Indus., Inc. v. Heery Int’l, 646 So. 2d 818, 823-24 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1994).
101. AM. INST. OF ARCHITECTS, AIA DOC. B101 § 3.6.4.2. (2017). Earlier versions of
the AIA documents contain slightly different wording. See, e.g., AM. INST. OF ARCHITECTS,
AIA DOC. B101 § 3.6.4.2 (2007). Courts finding an architect not liable based on a theory of
negligent review of shop drawings include Case v. Midwest Mech. Contractors, Inc., 876
S.W.2d 51, 51 (Mo. Ct. App. 1994) and Waggoner v. W & W Steel Co., 657 P.2d 147, 148
(Okla. 1982).
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on the contractor responsibility for site safety.102 As noted, these
allocations of responsibility for site safety have been largely
adopted by other industry organizations which have also
published standard form documents.103
Of course, many (often commercial) projects use custom
design agreements, and the architect’s duties must be understood
in light of that contract’s specific wording. For example, where
an architect was hired only to create the design and not to provide
site services, there can be no liability arising out of a theory of
negligent supervision.104 At the other extreme, large project
owners may impose detailed supervision obligations upon the
architect.105 Contracts authorizing the architect to stop the work
may well convince a court that an architect has a duty to exercise
that power when necessary to protect construction workers.106
102. See, e.g., Black & Vernooy Architects v. Smith, 346 S.W.3d 877, 886-87 (Tex.
App. 2011) (holding that architect did not have power to control performance of construction
at site because several contract provisions explicitly restricted architect’s authority); Yow v.
Hussey, Gay, Bell & Deyoung Int’l, Inc., 412 S.E.2d 565, 567-68 (Ga. Ct. App 1991).
103. See supra note 38 and accompanying text.
104. Rian v. Imperial Mun. Servs. Grp., Inc., 768 P.2d 1260, 1263-64 (Colo. App.
1988); Swartz v. Ford, Bacon & Davis Constr. Corp., 469 So. 2d 232, 233 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 1985); Patin, 421 So. 2d at 366; Jones v. James Reeves Contractors, Inc., 701 So. 2d
774, 784-86 (Miss. 1997); McAninch v. Robinson, 942 S.W.2d 452, 458 (Mo. Ct. App.
1997); Frampton, 648 A.2d at 327.
105. See e.g., Associated Eng’rs, Inc. v. Job, 370 F.2d 633, 638, 643-45 (8th Cir. 1966)
(applying South Dakota law; the architect contractually agreed to see that construction was
“expeditious and economical”; could subject the “manner of construction” to “inspection,
tests and approval”; was required to perform “constant supervision” and take “all reasonable
safety precautions”; and could stop the work if the contractor failed to use reasonable safety
precautions) (internal quotations omitted), cert. denied, Troy Cannon Constr. Co. v. Job, 389
U.S. 823 (1967); Geer v. Bennett, 237 So. 2d 311, 317 (Fla. Ct. App. 1970); Phillips v.
Mazda Motor Mfg. (USA) Corp., 516 N.W.2d 502, 507-508 (Mich. Ct. App. 1994),
abrogated on other grounds by Ormsby v. Capital Welding, Inc., 684 N.W.2d 320, 327
(Mich. 2004); Jones, 701 So. 2d at 785 (“It would seem natural that the supervision of safety
is encompassed in the duty to supervise, and no separate agreement to supervise safety is
necessary where the architect is supervising the details of every other aspect of the project.”);
Simon v. Omaha Pub. Power Dist., 202 N.W.2d 157, 161, 168 (Neb. 1972); Amant v. Pac.
Power & Light Co., 520 P.2d 181, 185 (Wash. Ct. App. 1974), aff’d per curiam, 529 P.2d
829 (Wash. 1975). But see Walker II, 242 Ark. 97, 105-06, 412 S.W.2d 621, 630 (1967).
The court in Jones disagreed with Walker II in dicta. Jones, 701 So. 2d at 785.
106. Associated Eng’rs, Inc., 370 F.2d at 644-45; Moore v. PRC Eng’g, Inc., 565 So.
2d 817, 820 (Fla. Ct. App. 1990). But see Parks v. Atkinson, 505 P.2d 279, 283 (Ariz. Ct.
App. 1973) (holding summary judgment for architect was appropriate even though he had
stopped the work twice because the “interruptions were solely to insure that the work was
being done in accordance with the plan and specifications”); Wheeler & Lewis v. Slifer, 577
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Moreover, regardless of the contract language, an architect, by its
conduct, may assume a duty of care regarding project safety.107
However, those projects which use the “modern” (post 1970)
AIA standard form documents, or documents of other industry
organizations reflecting the AIA’s allocation of responsibility for
site safety, have overwhelmingly concluded that an architect with
site services roles owes no duty of care toward construction
workers, at least absent the architect’s actual knowledge of the
hazardous condition.108 However, where the architect or engineer
P.2d 1092, 1094-95 (Colo. 1978) (finding the architect had the right to stop the work, but no
contractual control over the contractor with respect to day-to-day safety); Graham v. Freese
& Nichols, Inc., 927 S.W.2d 294, 296 (Tex. Ct. App. 1996) (finding the engineer stopped
the work twice due to quality concerns, not safety concerns).
107. Hanna v. Huer, Johns, Neel, Rivers & Webb, 662 P.2d 243, 252-53 (Kan. 1983),
superseded by statute on other grounds, KAN. STAT. ANN. § 44-501 (1985), as recognized
in Edwards v. Anderson Eng’g, Inc., 166 P.3d 1047, 1053 (Kan. 2007) (stating in dicta that
a design professional may by his conduct assume a duty of safety and listing several factors
by which to determine whether an expanded duty had been assumed); Simon, 202 N.W.2d at
168.
108. Baker v. Pidgeon Thomas Co., 422 F.2d 744, 746 (6th Cir. 1970) (applying
Arkansas law); Peck v. Horrocks Eng’rs, Inc., 106 F.3d 949, 955 (10th Cir. 1997) (applying
Utah law; AIA contract); Padgett v. CH2M Hill Se., Inc., 866 F. Supp. 563, 564-65 (M.D.
Ga. 1994); Poehmel v. Aqua Am. Penn., Inc., No. 3:10-cv-2372, 2013 WL 27493, at *7
(M.D. Pa. Jan. 2, 2013); Easter v. Percy, 810 P.2d 1053, 1056 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1991); Reber
v. Chandler High Sch. Dist. No. 202, 474 P.2d 852, 854 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1970); Seeney v.
Dover Cnty. Club Apartments, Inc., 318 A.2d 619, 624 (Del. Super. Ct. 1974); Vorndran v.
Wright, 367 So. 2d 1070, 1071 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1979); Yow v. Hussey, Gay, Bell &
DeYoung Int’l, Inc., 412 S.E.2d 565, 567 (Ga. Ct. App. 1991) (AIA General Conditions);
Jones v. City of Logansport, 436 N.E.2d 1138, 1150-51 (Ind. Ct. App. 1982), reh’g denied,
439 N.E.2d 666, 669 (Ind. Ct. App. 1982); Hanna, 662 P.2d at 250, 254 (AIA General
Conditions); Young v. Hard Rock Constr., L.L.C., 292 So. 3d 178, 183 (La. Ct. App. 2020)
(modified AIA contract); Black v. Gorman-Rupp, 791 So. 2d 793, 795-96 (La. Ct. App.
2001); Krieger v. J. E. Greiner Co., Inc., 382 A.2d 1069, 1074, 1079 (Md. 1978); MacInnis
v. Walsh Bros., Inc., No. 044250, 2006 WL 1047134, at *4-*5 (Mass. Super. Ct. March 23,
2006); Eleria v. City of St. Paul, No. A10-1045, 2010 WL 5293742, at *5 (Minn. Ct. App.
Dec. 28, 2010); Dillard v. Shaughnessy, Fickel & Scott Architects, 864 S.W.2d 368, 370
(Mo. Ct. App. 1993) (Kansas law); Brown v. Gamble Constr. Co., Inc., 537 S.W.2d 685, 687
(Mo. Ct. App. 1976); Hobson v. Waggoner Eng’g, Inc., 878 So. 2d 68, 77, 80 (Miss. Ct.
App. 2003); Kemp v. Bechtel Constr. Co., 720 P.2d 270, 274 (Mont. 1986), overruled on
other grounds by Beckman v. Butte-Silver Bow Cnty., 1 P.3d 348, 350 (Mont. 2000);
Pfenninger v. Hunterdon Cent. Reg’l High Sch., 770 A.2d 1126, 1129, 1141-43 (N.J. 2001)
(a somewhat confusing opinion in which the majority adopted the position of Justice
Coleman’s dissent on the question of the architect’s liability); Torres v. CTE Eng’rs, Inc.,
786 N.Y.S.2d 101, 101 (N.Y. App. Div. 2004); Welch v. Grant Dev. Co., Inc., 466 N.Y.S.2d
112, 114-15 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1983) (thorough analysis of modern AIA contracts); Nicholson
v. Turner/Cargile, 669 N.E.2d 529, 534 (Ohio Ct. App. 1995); Marshall v. Port Auth. of
Allegheny Cnty., 568 A.2d 931, 935 (Pa. 1990); Johnson v. EMPE, Inc., 837 S.W.2d 62, 65
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knew of the hazardous conditions, there is a split of authority.109
Some courts continue to exonerate the a/e, pointing to the general
contractor as the party responsible for safety at the construction
site.110 Other courts, emphasizing the safety-promotion principle
underlying tort law, have held or at least expressed the possibility
of finding a duty of care, especially if the a/e had the power to
stop the work.111 One standard form document imposes upon an
architect or engineer with knowledge of a safety violation a duty
to warn the owner; however, that provision has not been
interpreted by the courts.112
V. NATIONAL LAW—DEFENSES TO A/E LIABILITY
As should be clear from the discussion above, an architect’s
or engineer’s primary defense to a construction worker’s personal
injury claim, particularly where the claim asserts negligence
regarding site services, is that the design contract disclaimed the
a/e’s duty of care regarding site safety.113 In addition, as with any
professional liability claim, the plaintiff must present expert
testimony as to the standard of care and its violation, unless the
(Tenn. Ct. App. 1992); Graham, 927 S.W.2d at 295-96; Romero v. Parkhill, Smith &
Cooper, Inc., 881 S.W.2d 522, 526-27 (Tex. App. 1994) (AIA contract); Peterson v. Fowler,
493 P.2d 997, 999 (Utah 1972), overruled on other grounds by Stamper v. Johnson, 232 P.3d
514, 516-17 (Utah 2010); Porter v. Stevens, Thompson & Runyan, Inc., 602 P.2d 1192, 1193
(Wash. Ct. App. 1979); Baumeister v. Automated Prods., Inc., 690 N.W.2d 1, 2-3 (Wis.
2004); Makinen v. PM P.C., 893 P.2d 1149, 1154-55 (Wyo. 1995), overruled on other
grounds by Terex Corp. v. Hough, 50 P.3d 317, 321 (Wyo. 2002).
109. See Yow, 412 S.E.2d at 566-67.
110. Id. (stating in dicta that the architect’s knowledge of the hazardous condition
would not have given rise to a duty of care); Jones v. James Reeves Contractors, Inc., 701
So. 2d 774, 782-83 (Miss. 1997).
111. Balagna v. Shawnee Cnty., 668 P.2d 157, 163 (Kan. 1983), overruled by statute
on other grounds as stated in Edwards v. Anderson Eng’g, Inc., 166 P.3d 1047, 1053, 1056
(Kan. 2007) (summary judgment reversed; a factual question whether the engineer knew of
the hazardous condition); Carvalho v. Toll Bros. & Devs., 675 A.2d 209, 214 (N.J. 1996)
(engineer knew of hazard and had power to stop the work); Duncan v. Pennington Cnty.
Hous. Auth., 283 N.W.2d 546, 548 (S.D. 1979) (architect’s duty of supervision included
visits to the site by its employee several times a day, and the employee knew the work site
had received an OSHA citation which indicated that 20% of the temporary railings were
inadequate); Nauman v. Harold K. Beecher & Assocs., 426 P.2d 621, 622 (Utah 1967)
(knowledge of hazard coupled with authority to stop the work).
112. CONSENSUSDOCS, supra note 38, § 3.2.8.4.
113. See supra note 102.
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negligence is so clear as to not require such testimony.114
Furthermore, an a/e may assert any defense any defendant in a
personal injury lawsuit could raise, such as lack of causation.115
Finally, although this Article is devoted to common law
developments, it should be noted that a few states have amended
their workers’ compensation laws to extend immunity from tort
liability to design professionals, so long as the accident did not
arise out of the defendant’s design responsibilities.116
VI. CONCLUSION
The changes in construction accident law jurisprudence from
the mid-twentieth century to the present, and in particular a/e
liability for worksite accidents, may be viewed as a microcosm of
American tort law developments during the same period. The
most fundamental progression was from a no-duty regime to the
use of the foreseeability doctrine to determine the existence and
scope of a duty. However, the particular nature of construction
projects—they involve numerous unrelated parties who are on the
site only by virtue of a contract—has created something of a
“special case” in tort law, in which contractual risk allocations
and disclaimers become of paramount importance in the liability
landscape. In this regard, a focus on construction accident law,
and a/e liability in particular, may be a lens through which to
achieve insights into tort law more generally.117
114. See, e.g., Michael v. Huffman Oil Co., 661 S.E.2d 1, 11 (N.C. Ct. App. 2008).
115. McKean v. Yates Eng’g Corp., 200 So. 3d 431, 433 (Miss. 2016) (criticizing the
quality of the design, however, the court pointed out that the contractor had “ignored
essential features of [the engineer’s] scaffolding design,” thereby implying that any defect
in the design was not a causal factor in the scaffold’s collapse); Baumeister v. Automated
Prods., Inc., 690 N.W.2d 1, 9-10 (Wis. 2004) (holding plaintiffs did not establish causation,
as they did not follow the truss manufacturer’s instructions).
116. A compilation of these statutes is found at 1 JON L. GELMAN, MODERN WORKERS
COMPENSATION § 103:34 (2021). See also Architect’s or Engineer’s Liability, supra note
5, §§ 34-39.
117. Similarly, construction industry disputes may be a lens through which to examine
the development of American contract law. See generally CARL J. CIRCO, CONTRACT LAW
IN THE CONSTRUCTION INDUSTRY CONTEXT (2020); Carl J. Circo, The Construction
Industry in the U.S. Supreme Court: Part 1, Contract Law, 41 CONSTR. LAW. 6 (2021); Carl
J. Circo, The Construction Industry in the U.S. Supreme Court: Part 2, Beyond Contract
Law, 41 CONSTR. LAW. 5 (2021).
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